Tracked shipping to South Africa with premium packaging for just R199 

Ship to
South Africa
0

My Account

  • argentina
  • chile
  • colombia
  • españa
  • méxico
  • perú
  • estados unidos
  • internacional

menu

Select your country

Americas

Europe

Rest of the world

portada Strategic Warning & The Role of Intelligence
Type
Physical Book
Publisher
Author
Language
English
Pages
68
Format
Paperback
Dimensions
28x21.6x0.4 cm
Weight
0.18 kg.
ISBN13
9781479145119
Categories

Strategic Warning & The Role of Intelligence

Agency, Central Intelligence (Author) · Createspace · Paperback

Strategic Warning & The Role of Intelligence - Agency, Central Intelligence

New Book Imported to South Africa
Delivery: 02 Oct - 15 Oct Shipping: 16 to 20 business days.
R 465
R 465

Choose the list to add your product or create one New List

Go to My Wishlists
Calculate shipping cost

Synopsis "Strategic Warning & The Role of Intelligence"

The Czechoslovak crisis, as it came to be known, started in January 1968, when Alexander Dubcek was elevated to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), replacing moribund Antonin Novotny, who had served as First Secretary since 1957. Under Dubcek, the communist leadership embarked on a program of dramatic liberalization of the Czechoslovak political, economic, and social order, including the overhaul of the CPCz leadership, increased freedom of speech, surrender of authority to the Czech National Assembly by the Communist Part, real elections as local and national levels, and even the suggestion of legalizing non-communist political parties. In all, the crisis lasted more than a year, with the first none months consisting of Czech reforms triggering Soviet statements of concern and eventually threats, buttressed by Warsaw Pact military buildups disguised as exercises. When the invasion occurred in the early morning hours of 21 August, the Czechoslovak leadership as not immediately removed, but remained largely intact through April 1969, when Dubcek was finally replaced as First Secretary by a more pro-Soviet Gustav Husak. All this alarmed Moscow and the leadership of the Warsaw Pact, but throughout the Prague Spring, Dubcek went out of his way to demonstrate his personal loyalty to Moscow and Prague's intention to remain firmly within the Warsaw Pact military alliance. How sincere he was in these remonstrations is difficult to say, but Dubcek and his allies clearly feared a repetition of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, brutally crushed by Soviet troops. These fears were mirrored in Washington and, to a certain extent, even in Moscow.

Customers reviews

More customer reviews
  • 0% (0)
  • 0% (0)
  • 0% (0)
  • 0% (0)
  • 0% (0)

Frequently Asked Questions about the Book

Is the book original?

All books in our catalog are Original.

In what language is the book written?

The book is written in English.

What is the format of this book?

The binding of this edition is Paperback.

Questions and Answers about the Book

Do you have a question about the book? Login to be able to add your own question.

Opinions about Bookdelivery

More customer reviews